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Firms that lay off staff can see a significant reduction in the performance of their remaining workers, according to our
experimental study. Our research suggests that firms that decide to ‘downsize’ their workforce should be wary of how
the layoff decision is perceived by the remaining (“surviving”) workers. If the surviving staff interpret the decision as
a way to boost profits at the cost of the workers, they might react negatively.
Lay-offs are an integral part of dynamic economies. For example, in Germany at least one large firm announces cuts
of at least 800 jobs on each third working day of the year. Lay-offs impose massive costs on the displaced workers,
the regional economy and social insurances. Hence, it is no surprise that layoffs are often discussed controversially
in the general public and the media, and receive a lot of attention by scholars and practitioners.
From the firm’s perspective, the benefits of lay-offs seem to be obvious – in particular, labor costs and organisational
slack can be reduced. Firms considering laying off workers have to weigh these benefits with potential costs. Some
types of costs (e.g. severance payments) are more or less calculable in advance, while other costs are ex ante hard
to estimate. In particular, there may be substantial costs associated with a decrease in the motivation of the workers
who stay in firms after lay-offs – a phenomenon called ‘survivor syndrome’.
We set up a lab experiment with 400 students at the Goethe-University Frankfurt to study how non-fired employees
respond to an employer’s decision to fire a co-worker. In our experiment, employees work for an employer whose
payoff depends on the employees’ performance in a real-effort task. Subsequently, the employer is provided with an
incentive to layoff one of her/his employees. After her/his decision for or against firing, the remaining employees
continue to work for the employer.
To analyse whether the remaining employees’ performance is driven by the employer’s decision to layoff an
employee or its implementation, we conduct a control treatment in which it is randomly decided whether an
employee is fired or not.
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We find that survivors reduce their performance substantially in response to the employer’s decision to lay off a co-
worker. The reduction is strongest for survivors who interpret the employer’s decision as a method to increase
profits at the cost of the workers; it is weaker if they can comprehend the layoff decision, and it vanishes (in the
control treatment) if the employer is forced to fire a co-worker. It seems that the survivors in our experiment perceive
an employer’s decision to lay off a co-worker as a signal that she does not expect them to perform well or cares
more about her/his own payoff than the well-being of the employees. Our results suggest that this negative signal
leads to a decrease in employees’ performance.
Our experimental results imply that firms deciding in favour of layoffs should be wary about how their decision is
perceived by their workforce. In firms laying off workers, one can observe a number of business practices that are
puzzling at first glance. Our study can provide one potential explanations for these practices.
First, firms often use natural fluctuations to reduce the level of staffing instead of firing workers. The existence of
such a policy is quite surprising – firms can more rapidly adjust their labor force by simply firing some workers. One
potential explanation for this business practice could be that firms try to mitigate the survivor syndrome.
A second fact is that firms laying off workers often claim that they have “no choice”. A rational for this communication
strategy could be that firms try to prevent that employees perceive the employer’s layoff decision as an attempt to
increase profits at the cost of the workers. It is, however, an open question whether employees really believe
management’s declaration. One way to verify declarations could be a strong cooperation with the works council.
Third, research has shown that top management turnover is higher after downsizing. One explanation for this
phenomenon could be that firms try to limit the negative impact of the lay-off decision by separating from the
management with the lay-off history. After the separation, the new management can blame the predecessors.
A fourth fact is that firms that are downsizing often provide outplacement services for the leavers, and make financial
offers for voluntary leavers (even if these offers are quite expensive and, because of their better outside options, the
more able workers who separate). A rational for such business practices could be that firms try to attenuate the
negative signal of the lay-off decision by the provision of positive signals.
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Notes:
This blog post is based on the authors’ paper The Hidden Costs of Downsizing, The Economic Journal,
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focus of his research is downsizing. Matthias analyses downsizing from different perspectives; depending on the
perspective, and the underlying research questions, he applies different empirical methods and
datasets.
 
Copyright © 2015 London School of Economics
3/3
